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L Facs
On June 25, 1992, James Neil Tucker ("Tucker") drove up Dolly Oakley's
("Oakley") driveway, forced her into her home, and attempted to bind her with
tape in her bedroom. However, he was interrupted by two men looking for
Oakley's husband before he could completely restrain Oakley. Tucker took
Oakley outside where Oakley pleaded with her husband's friends not to leave.
She told them that she was in danger, but despite her pleas, the two men sped
away, and Tucker dragged Oakley back inside. Tucker then stole fourteen dollars
from Oakley's purse and shot her twice in the head- once when she tried to grab
the gun and again "to 'put her out of her misery."' 1
Tucker was tried in South Carolina state court and found guilty of the
murder of Dolly Oakley.2 During the sentencing proceedings, Tucker's trial
counsel presented the testimony of forensic psychologist Dr. Robert Noelker
("Dr. Noelker").3 Dr. Noelker testified that, although Tucker "understood the
requirements of the law," he suffered from an" 'antisocial personality disor-
der'" ("APD") brought on byphysical and sexual abuse that left him unable to
behave in accordance with the law.4 Tucker's wife, two "vocational rehabilitation
workers" acquainted with Tucker, and the widow of one of Tucker's former
prison mates also testified on behalf of Tucker during the sentencing proceed-
ings.' The prosecution responded by presenting the testimony of three expert
witnesses who concurred with Dr. Noelker's diagnosis of APD but did not agree
with Dr. Noelker that the disorder prevented Tucker from obeying the law.6 The
prosecution experts held the viewthat APD is not a mental disease or defect but
only a description of behavior.7
The jury recommended a sentence of death after finding the presence of
three statutory aggravating factors, and the trial court sentenced Tucker to death
1. Tucker v. Ozmint, 350 F.3d 433, 436-37 (4th Cir. 2003).
2. Id at 437. Tucker was also found guilty of "kidnapping, first-degree burglary, armed
robbery, and possession of a weapon during a violent crime for actions at the Oakley residence."
Id In addition, Tucker was convicted for two other break-ins that took place after the murder of
Oakley. Id
3. Id
4. Id
5. Id at 441.
6. Id at 437.
7. Tudeer, 350 F.3d at 437-38.
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upon the jury's recommendation! Tucker was denied relief on direct appeal to
the Supreme Court of South Carolina, the United States Supreme Court, and in
state postconviction proceedings.' Tucker then filed a writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C S 2254 in the United States District Court for the District
of South Carolina." The district court denied relief on the merits, and Tucker
appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. 1 In his
appeal, Tucker claimed his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in viola-
tion of the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution due to: (1) a
failure to turn over two documents relating to Tucker's childhood sexual abuse
to Dr. Noelker; and (2) a failure to investigate and discover that one of the
prosecution's three expert witnesses was on professional probation at the time
the witness testified.12
I. Hd&in
After applying the two-pronged standard for ineffective assistance of
counsel from Stridklaniv Wasbingto 13 the Fourth Circuit held that Tucker's trial
counsel did not render ineffective assistance of counsel. 4 First, the court held
that under Wign v Sni i' Tucker's trial counsel was not required to investigate
8. Id at 438. The court instructed the jury to consider both statutory and non-statutory
mitigating factors as well as statutory aggravating factors. Id; see S.C CODE ANN. S 16-3-20(C
(a)- (b) (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 2003) (codifying the mitigating and aggravating circumstances
to be considered by a jury during sentencing deliberations in South Carolina). Tucker's jury
instruction included the following mitigating factors: (1) cooperation with law enforcement; (2) the
circumstances of Tucker's childhood; (3) the circumstance of Tucker's imprisonment; and (4)
mitigating circumstances supported bythe evidence. Tucer, 350 F.3d at 438. Tucker also received
a sentence of "life imprisonment for kidnapping, life imprisonment for first-degree burglary,
twenty-five years for armed robbery, five years for possession of a weapon, five years for third-
degree burglary, and thirty days for larceny." Id
9. Tucker, 350 F.3d at 438; swState v. Tucker, 478 S.E.2d 260, 271 (S.C 1996) (affirming
both Tucker's conviction and sentence), crEt daeg 520 U.S. 1200 (1997); Tucker v. Maynard, 534
U.S. 1073, 1073 (2002) (mene.) (denying a stay of execution and denying certioranr.
10. Tutker, 350 F.3d at 438; see 28 U.S.C S 2254 (2000) (providing standard for issuance of
a writ of habeas corpus; part of AEDPA).
11. The opinion does not indicate whether the district court or the Fourth Circuit issued a
certificate of appealability Se 28 U.S.C S 2253(c)(1) (2000) (providing for an appeal only after a
circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, part of AEDPA).
12. Tucker, 350 F.3d at 436; sm U.S. CONST. amend. VI (stating that "(i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right .. . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence").
13. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
14. Tudeer, 350 F.3d at 445; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,687 (1984) (holding that
to prove ineffective assistance of counsel a defendant "must show that counsel's performance was
deficient" and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense to such a degree so "as to deprive the
defendant of a fair trial").
15. 123 S. Cr. 2527 (2003).
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every avenue of mitigation evidence and, unlike trial counsel in Wigim, Tucker's
trial counsel's investigation into Tucker's childhood abuse was not unreasonably
limited.16 Second, the court held that Tucker's trial counsel had no reason to
suspect that the prosecution witness was subject to discipline and that in such a
case counsel does not act unreasonably in not investigating the professional
status of non-crucial expert witnesses."
III A ndyis
The Fourth Circuit first noted that it reviews de novo a denial of habeas
relief in the district court based on the record of the state court.18 Next, the
court found that when reviewing a denial of postconviction relief on the merits
in a state court under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
("AEDPA"), a court of appeals can grant habeas relief onlyif "the state court's
decision was 'contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States.' "19 The Fourth Circuit found that the state court properly identified
Stnid/and as the applicable law for determining ineffective assistance of counsel
and concluded, therefore, that habeas relief was unavailable to Tucker under the
"contrary to" prong of S 2254(d)(1).21 Under Stricklar a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel can succeed onlyif: (1) counsel's performance is shown to
have fallen "below an objective standard of reasonableness"; and (2) that the
defendant was so prejudiced by counsel's errors that "there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the pro-
ceeding would have been different."2' The court stated that the focus of its
16. Tuer, 350 F.3d at 441-42; see Wiggins v. Smith, 123 S. CL 2527, 2538 (2003) (finding
that defense counsel's investigation fell well short of established professional norms). For a
complete discussion and analysis of Wqzm, se rmvy Terrence T. Egland, Case Note, 16 CAP.
DEF.J. 101 (2003) (analyzing Wiggins v. Smith, 123 S. Ct. 2527 (2003)).
17. Tuder, 350 F.3d at 444-45.
18. Il at 438; se Bell v. Ozmint, 332 F.3d 229, 233 (4th Qar. 2003) (holding that under
AEDPA courts of appeals "conduct de novo review of a 'district court's decision on a petition for
writ of habeas corpus based on a state court record'" (quoting Spicer v. Roxbury Corr. Inst., 194
F.3d 547,555 (4th Cir. 1999))). For a complete discussion and analysis of Bd, seegra/y Maxwell
C Smith, Case Note, 16 CAP. DEF.J. 121 (2003) (analyzing Bell v. Ozmint, 332 F.3d 229 (4th Cir.
2003)).
19. Tudker, 350 F.3d at 438 (quoting 28 U.S.C 5 2254(d)(1) (2000)). Courts of appeals can
also grant habeas relief if the state court decision was "based on an unreasonable determination of
the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C S 2254(d)(2).
Tucker claimed the state court made several "unreasonable determination[s]" of fact, but the Fourth
Circuit found it unnecessary to consider them in light of its ruling that Tucker's trial counsel was
not ineffective in their mitigation investigation. Tudeer, 350 F.3d at 443 n.6; 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(2).
20. Tuder, 350 F.3d at 439 n.2; seeStridm, 466 U.S. at 687 (formulating atwo-pronged test
for determining ineffective assistance of counsel.
21. Tucker, 350 F.3d at 439 (citing Stridkl 466 U.S. at 688, 694).
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inquiry was whether the state court's application of Smtiland was" 'objectively
unreasonable.' "22
A. Failure to CorduaAdequate Imestigion
Tucker first claimed that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance
when they did not provide Dr. Noelker with two reports further elaborating on
Tucker's childhood sexual abuse.23 In particular, Tucker claimed that his trial
counsel "unreasonablylimited the scope of their investigation into his childhood
abuse. ' 24 The Fourth Circuit noted that counsel's failure to investigate ade-
quately mitigating evidence can amount to ineffective assistance as the United
States Supreme Court demonstrated in Wiggn.2  The court pointed out that,
unlike in Wi,, Tucker's counsel did not put on a " 'halfhearted mitigation
case.' "26 The court emphasized the fact that defense counsel presented five
witnesses, including the forensic psychologist Dr. Noelker, as well as Tucker's
wife and others who knew him." Dr. Noelker testified regarding his diagnosis
of APD and its origins in Tucker's exposure to sexual abuse and parental indif-
ference.28 Dr. Noelker also reviewed a social historyreport compiled bya social
worker in preparation for Tucker's prior trial for, inter alia, capital murder.29 The
court concluded that there was no doubt that the jury was "offered a clear,
coherent mitigation case that focused on Tucker's history of abuse."30
The court compared the failure of counsel in Wizr with the actions of
Tucker's trial counsel.' The court concluded that Tucker's trial counsel's
performance far exceeded the inadequate performance in Wim. 32 The court
stated that" 'Strielamddoes not impose a constitutional requirement that counsel
uncover every scrap of evidence that could conceivably help their client"' and
22. Id (quoting Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002)).
23. d at 440.
24. Id
25. Id; see Wi rs, 123 S. C. at 2538 (holding that an investigation falling short of profes-
sional norms amounts to ineffective assistance of counsel).
26. Tucker, 350 F.3d at 440-41 (quoting Wiaa, 123 S. Cc. at 2537-38).
27. Id at 441.
28. Id
29. Id at 437, 441. The court noted that defense counsel did not call the social worker
because of her poor performance at Tucker's prior trial. Id at 441 n.3.
30. Id at 441.
31. Id
32. Tucker, 350 F.3d at 441. In WzAbv, defense counsel failed to obtain a social historyre port
when funds were available for such a purpose and the prevailing professional norms in Maryland
required the use of such a report at sentencing. Wigb, 123 S. Cr. at 2536-37.
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held that the trial court's decision was not an unreasonable application of Strkk-
ands performance prong.
33
The court further concluded that had Tucker's counsel's performance been
deficient, he suffered no prejudice as a result.34 The court again cited Wigim, this
time for the proposition that when a reviewing court determines prejudice it
must " 'reweigh the evidence in aggravation against the totality of available
mitigating evidence.' " The court further found that under Strilard a defen-
dant has been prejudiced only when "the facts 'undermine confidence in the
outcome' of the proceeding."36
As for aggravating circumstances, the court pointed out that the prosecution
proved the following three aggravators: (1) kidnapping; (2) burglar, and (3)
armed robbery." On the other hand, the court found that the mitigation case
would not have been significantly bolstered by Dr. Noelker receiving the two
extra reports on Tucker's childhood sexual abuse.38 The court noted that the
significant evidence of Tucker's childhood presented to the jury an adequate
picture of the abuse Tucker suffered. 9 Further, the court recognized that both
the defense and prosecution experts had agreed that Tucker was the victim of
childhood sexual abuse and that the additional evidence would not have added
to Tucker's mitigation case.4" The court again cited the three prosecution
witnesses who refuted Dr. Noelker's conclusions as to the effect of APD on
criminal behavior and found that the additional evidence would have added little
to defense counsel's cross-examination of the witnesses.41 Thus, the court
concluded that the state court did not unreasonably apply Strik/ards prejudice
prong and that the district court properly denied habeas relief on the claim
regarding the two reports.42
33. Tu&er, 350 F.3d at 442 (quoting Green v. French, 143 F.3d 865, 892 (4th Cir. 1998)).
34. Id
35. Id (quoting W4,mz, 123 S. Ct. at 2542).
36. Id (quoting StndrL/am, 466 U.S. at 694).
37. Id The jury also was presented evidence of Tucker's crimes following the events at the
Oakley residence, which included another murder for which he was convicted prior to this
prosecution and for which he received a sentence of death. Id; see State v. Tucker, 512 S.E.2d 99,
102, 106 (S.C 1999) (affirming Tucker's sentence of death for the armed robbery and murder of
Shannon Mellon).
38. Tu&'e, 350 F.3d at 442.
39. Id at 442-43.
40. Id
41. Id
42. Id
20041
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B. Failure to Inmtigzte Praamn Wms
Tucker also claimed that his trial counsel were ineffective because theyfailed
to discover the probationary status of Dr. John Dunlap ("Dr. Dunlap"), one of
the prosecution's three expert witnesses." Tucker's appellate counsel discovered
that Dr. Dunlap had been placed on professional probation during the time that
Tucker's trial took place." Tucker argued that his trial counsel should have
discovered this information to impeach Dr. Dunlap's testimony."
The court found no merit in Tucker's contention because there was no
indication at the time of trial that Dr. Dunlap was on probation.46 The court
agreed that trial counsel must investigate prosecution witnesses for methods of
cross-examination and failure to investigate may amount to ineffective
assistance.4" Part of the determination was based on the importance of the
witness to the prosecution's case.4" Had Dr. Dunlap been crucial to the prosecu-
tion's case, failure to investigate his professional status mayhave taken on more
importance.49 However, the court found that Dr. Dunlap was merely a redun-
dant witness confirming the testimony of other competent witnesses."0 The
court concluded that Dr. Dunlap's testimonywas not" 'critical to the determina-
tion of guilt.'"51
Further, the court found that neither the prosecution nor defense counsel
knew of Dr. Dunlap's probation. 2 Also, Dr. Dunlap's testimony did not give
any indication of his probationarystatus." The court pointed out that "the only
way to find out about Dr. Dunlap's record would have been to subpoena docu-
ments from, or file a [Freedom of Information Act] request with, the Board of
43. Id at 444.
44. Tuder, 350 F.3d at 444.
45. d
46. Id
47. Id (citing Huffington v. Nuth, 140 F.3d 572,580 (4th Cir. 1998) and Hoots v. Allsbrook,
785 F.2d 1214, 1221 (4th Cir. 1986)).
48. Id
49. See id (noting Dr. Dunlap's relative unimportance to the overall case compared to alibi
witnesses or eyewitnesses).
50. Tucer, 350 F.3d at 444.
51. Id (quoting Hiptca 140 F.3d at 580). Hfgtos was not a capital case. SeeHt4gtrn,
140 F.3d at 575 (When the State elected not to seek the death penalty, the state trial court
resentenced Huffington to consecutive life terms."). The court did not address the fact that the
United States Supreme Court has required that factors that lead to the imposition of the death
penalty be subjected to a heightened reliability standard. SweWoodson v. North Carolina, 428 US.
280, 305 (1976) ("Because of that qualitative difference (between a sentence of life and a sentence
of death], there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the determination that
death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.").
52. Tucker, 350 F.3d at 444-45.
53. Id at 445.
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Medical Examiners." 4 The court concluded that when a witness is non-crucial,
as was Dr. Dunlap, failing to conduct such investigations is not unreasonable."5
The court also found an absence of prejudice even if Tucker's counsel's
performance had been ineffective. 6 The court highlighted the cumulative nature
of Dr. Dunlap's testimony and the fact that trial counsel attempted to impeach
his testimony.5" The court found that the testimony of Dr. Dunlap was not
essential to the prosecution's case and that the State's theorythat APD is not an
excuse for criminal behavior was adequately conveyed with or without his
testimony.8 The court concluded that in light of the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances in Tucker's case, the failure to discover Dr. Dunlap's probationary
status did "not 'undermine confidence in the outcome' of the proceeding." 9
IV. A pplicatn in Vn lza
A. Wiggins Issue
Read in conjunction with Byram v 0knii,6 Tudker further illustrates the
limited effect that the Supreme Court's holding in Wz~im has in the Fourth
Circuit.61 According to Wtin, for ineffective performance to be found, trial
counsel must have unreasonably limited the scope of their investigation in light
of "prevailing professional norms." 62 However, unlike the United States Su-
preme Court in Wii, the Fourth Circuit made no reference to the "prevailing
professional standards" in its review of Tucker's trial.63 Instead, the Fourth
Circuit only recounted the mitigation case that Tucker's trial counsel presented
and deemed it adequate and thorough without a comparison with prevailing
54. Id
55. Id The court also noted that Tucker's trial counsel did attempt to impeach Dr. Dunlap's
testimony. Id The court cited Strick/ad for the proposition that "the distorting effects of hind-
sight" should not be allowed to affect the review of trial counsel's performance. Id (quoting
Stir/ arg 466 U.S. at 689).
56. Id
57. Id
58. Tucker, 350 F.3d at 445.
59. id (quoting Stark/ar 466 U.S. at 694).
60. 339 F.3d 203 (4th Cir. 2003).
61. See Tucker, 350 F.3d at 441 (finding mitigation case presented by defense counsel to be
adequate and thorough); Byram v. Ozmint, 339 F.3d 203,210 (4th Car. 2003) (finding that Byram's
defense counsel's limited investigation into mitigating evidence was not unreasonable, and distin-
guishing the facts in WWi). For a complete discussion and analysis of Bymn; sweveniy Terrence
T. Egland, Case Note, 16 CAP. DEF.J. 133 (2003) (analyzing Byram v. Ozmint, 339 F.3d 203 (4th
Cir. 2003)).
62. Tucker, 350 F.3d at 441 (citing Wg'v, 123 S. C. at 2536).
63. Id at 441-42; see W,&i, 123 S. Cc. at 2536 (finding that Wiggins's defense counsel's
performance fell below the prevailing professional norms in Maryland).
2004]
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professional norms.6' A mitigation case consisting of only a four laywitnesses
and one expert, a forensic psychologist, whose testimony was easily refuted by
three experts for the prosecution, would not be adequate under Virginia's
professional norms.65 In 2002, Virginia designed a statutory standard for the
representation of capital defendants through its development of Capital Defense
Units ("CD'U").66 "The General Assemblyhas required that when a circuit judge
appoints defense counsel to an indigent capital defendant, 'one of the attorneys
appointed shall be from a capital defense unit maintained bythe Public Defender
Commission."'67 Each CDU employs a fact investigator and a mitigation special-
ist in order to mount the best possible mitigation case for each defendant it
represents.6" In addition, every Virginia capital defendant is entitled to a mitiga-
tion expert ("3:1 expert"), usually a forensic psychologist, under section 19.2-
264.3:1.69 Therefore, each capital defendant assigned a CDU attorney receives
the benefit of a defense team comprised of two capital defense attorneys, a fact
investigator, a 3:1 expert, and a mitigation specialist."0 The Fourth Circuit has yet
to adopt this standard for capital representation even though the United States
Supreme Court has endorsed a similar model based on the American Bar Associ-
ation guidelines for capital representation.71
64. Tudker, 350 F.3d at 441-42.
65. Scr id at 441 (noting that Tucker's trial counsel presented "five witnesses, including
Tucker's wife, two vocational rehabilitation workers who knew Tucker, a widow whose husband
Tucker had befriended while in prison, and Dr. Noelker" as mitigation witnesses during sentencing
proceedings); swa/so Daniel L. Payne, Buddinig the CaseforL 0 A Mitigtion Speist as a Neesityand
aMattr cRigt, 16 CAP. DEF.J. 43, 59-60 (2003) (discussing the prevailing professional norms in
Virginia).
66. Payne, supra note 65, at 59; se VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-163.2.10 (Michie Supp. 2003)
(requiring the Public Defender Commission to "establish four regional capital defense units by the
end of fiscal year 2004").
67. Payne, supra note 65, at 60 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-163.7 (Michie Supp. 2003));
see VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-163.7 (requiring appointment of a CDUattorneyin each Virginia capital
case).
68. Payne, supra note 65, at 59.
69. Sie VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1(A) (Michie Supp. 2003) (providing for the appoint-
ment of "one or more qualified mental health experts to evaluate the defendant and to assist the
defense in the preparation and presentation of information concerning the defendant's history,
character, or mental condition, including ... whether there are any other factors in mitigation").
70. Payne, supra note 65, at 59-60; see Affidavits of John B. Boatwright, III, Leonard R.
Piotrowski, and Joseph A. igliozzi, Jr, lead attorneys for the Central Virginia, Northern Virginia,
and Southeastern Virginia Capital Defender Units, respectively (on file with the Virginia Capital
Case Clearinghouse) (stating that the staff of each CDU consists of three capital defense attorneys,
a fact investigator, and a mitigation specialist).
71. See Wti&bm, 123 S. Ct. at 2537 (recognizing the American Bar Association standards for
capital representation as a reasonable guide for professional norms). See gera/ray ABA Guidelines
for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases § 4.1 (rev. ed.
2003) (detailing the minimum requirements for the appointment and performance for death penalty
[Vol. 16:2
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B. The Na1 for a Mitigatn Speialist
The Tudeer court found it unconvincing that the two extra reports from
Tucker's Utah juvenile records would have added anything to the mitigation
case. 2 For a limited investigation into mitigating evidence to rise to the level of
ineffective assistance under Strikaevr a court must find that the mitigating effect
of evidence not investigated or presented would have so bolstered the mitigation
case that the defendant was prejudiced to such a degree that the outcome of the
trial would have been different."3 Relying on its conclusion that Dr. Noelker gave
a full account of Tucker's childhood sexual and physical abuse, the court found
that Tucker was not prejudiced by his defense counsel's failure to present the
reports to Dr. Noelker before he testified and that the reports would have likely
been redundant. 4
The Fourth Circuit's conclusion emphasizes the importance of employing
a mitigation specialist in ewry capital case." The mitigation specialist can investi-
gate, organize, and help present a much more compelling mitigation case than
one forensic psychologist can acting alone.76 Had a mitigation specialist been
included on the defense team from the start, Tucker's background historywould
have been synthesized so as to include all relevant detail. Mitigation specialists
can research information that provides rich detail for a defendant's mitigation
case. In turn, this detail can provide the 3:1 mitigation expert with documentary
and other materials to enhance the credibility of his testimony." Dr. Noelker's
testimonywas clinical in nature and obviously not as convincing as it could have
been with the inclusion of a mitigation specialist on the defense team s
defense and suggesting the appointment of two capital defense attorneys, a fact investigator, a
forensic psychologist, and a mitigation expert).
72. Tuder, 350 F.3d at 442-43.
73. Id at 442.
74. Id at 442-43.
75. A mitigation speaUS4 employed to investigate and compile mitigating evidence, must be
distinguished from a mitigation cepen, mandated by section 19.2-264.3:1 and usually a forensic
psychologist or other mental health expert. Se Payne, s"pra note 65, at 45-48 (explaining the role
of a mitigation specialist); VA. CODE ANN. 5 19.2-264.3:1 (Michie Supp. 2003) (providing for the
appointment of "one or more qualified mental health experts" to aid in presentation of mitigation
evidence).
76. Se Payne, s"pra note 65, at 44-45 (arguing that a mitigation specialist is needed and
required on the defense team for all capital cases "[b]ecause no other member of the defense team
has either the proper training or the experience to develop properly and investigate thoroughly all
potential mitigating circumstances").
77. Sw VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.3:1 (providing for the appointment of "one or more
qualified mental health experts" to aid in the presentation of mitigation evidence).
78. Sw Tuder, 350 F.3d at 442 (recounting Dr. Noelker's testimony at trial in which he noted
Tucker's childhood physical and sexual abuse and how the abuse resulted in Tucker's APD). The
2004]
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C Imetigtonom r t Exper
It is also important to note that if the prosecution knew that Dr. Dunlap
was on professional probation, a violation of Brady v Marlard9 would have
occurred." Under Brady, the prosecution is obligated to turn over all evidence
in its possession which bears on the guilt or innocence of the defendant or on
the determination of penalty.81 Dr. Dunlap's probationarystatus could have been
used to impeach his testimony and thus could have lessened the impact of the
prosecution's rebuttal expert witnesses who cast doubt on the effect of APD on
criminal behavior. It is important for defense counsel to realize that the prosecu-
tion could present witnesses who have professional records containing disciplin-
ary actions against them. Defense counsel should investigate the professional
backgrounds of key prosecution experts in order to ascertain if any disciplinary
action can be used to impeach the witness. Defense counsel should also ask the
prosecution to disclose the professional records of prosecution experts. 2 When
the prosecution is lining up expert witnesses to refute defense witnesses, as in
Tucker, this point becomes even more important. Defense counsel must do
everything possible to lessen the impact of the parade of experts.
D Lini Value 'fC rgm A ntsaPe sc&any D oner
Tu&er also makes clear that the value of claiming that a defendant suffers
from APD is limited.83 The prosecution has the ability to present numerous
experts willing to testify that APD is not a disease but merely a definition of
behavior. 4 Without more, it appears that claiming APD is an ineffective mitigat-
ing factor and should be used as only one piece of a larger mitigation strategy.8"
excluded reports would have aided in refuting the prosecution's claim that Tucker's abuse allega-
tions were fabricated. Id
79. 373 US. 83 (1963).
80. Bradyv. Mayland, 373 U.S. 83,86 (1963) (holding that suppression of penaltyevidence
favorable to the defense violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); s U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, S 1 (stating in pertinent part that "[n]o State shall make or enforce any law
which shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law").
81. Brad 373 US. at 86-87.
82. For a Bradymotion requesting disclosure bythe prosecution of records in its possession,
please contact the Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse at (540) 458-8557.
83. See Tu&er, 350 F.3d at 443 (denying relief even though Tucker was subjected to physical
and sexual "abuse [that], according to Dr. Noelker, resulted in the development of a personality
disorder, which caused Tucker to engage in aggressive and violent behaviors").
84. See id ("[The State's experts uniformly testified that antisocial personality disorder is
merely descriptive and does not explain the cause for Tucker's criminal behavior.").
85. In fact, a diagnosis of APD has tended to support a finding of future dangerousness. See
Williams v. Angelone, No. 98-28,1999 WL 249026, at *2 (4th Cir. Apr. 28,1999) (unpublished table
decision) (Because of [antisocial personaltydisorders] aggravating nature, counsel elected not to
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V. CQaisxi n
Tucker illustrates Wtiiz's minimal impact on ineffective assistance of
counsel claims concerning limited mitigation investigations in the Fourth Circuit
to date. In the Fourth Circuit, trial counsel's investigation must seem reasonable
onlyto the court standing alone and not in comparison to prevailing professional
norms as required by Wigis. Further, Tudeer illustrates the need to investigate
prosecution expert witnesses for evidence that can be used to impeach their
testimony.
Terrence T. Egland
submit Dr. Zwemer's report into evidence or call him to testify."); Satcher v. Pruett, 126 F.3d 561,
572 (4th Gr. 1997) ("The record indicates that these experts found no psythiatric or neurological
disorders but found that Satcher had an antisocial personality disorder that might make him a
'future danger.' "). Again, this point emphasizes the need for a mitigation specialist who can explore
all avenues of possible mitigating evidence. Seenmga/ayPayne, sura note 65 (discussing the role and
benefits of employing a mitigation specialist).
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